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high the banner of privacy in Roth,zz a major obscenity decision of
the Warren years, and Chime/ v. Ca/ifornia,zJ which narrowed the
limits of warrantless searches incident to an arrest. But he resolutely opposed the reapportionment revolution and was the lone dissenter in Flast v. Cohen,z4 where the Justices modified standing
requirements and broadened the opportunities for taxpayers to contest government programs. He seldom appears to have met a monopolistic business corporation he didn't like.zs
A lawyer's lawyer, it was appropriate that Harlan filled the
seat occupied by Robert Jackson, another first-class advocate, litigator, and process-oriented jurist, whose occasional eloquence on behalf of freedom of speech and liberty was exceeded only by his belief
in conspiracies and his passion for order.26 But from the perspective of 1992 and the present Supreme Court, now packed with political lackeys and intellectual harlots, even Jackson and Harlan have
taken on the stature of devoted civil libertarians. One can only
hope and pray that the Casey five continue to read the Harlan of
Griswold and not the Harlan of Flemming.

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A.
Burt.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1992.
Pp. 454. $29.95.
Michael Stokes Paulsen 2
I

The Constitution in Conflict is a disappointingly weak book
about a powerful and important idea in constitutional law. The
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. 395 u.s. 752 (1969).
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. Harlan's principal clients at Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland prior to his judicial
appointments had included American Telephone and Telegraph, Western Electric, International Telephone and Telegraph, the Gillette Safety Razor Company, American Optical and
DuPont. He represented the latter in their unsuccessful effon to maintain a dominant financial interest in General Motors, and when the Supreme Coun finally sustained the government's Clayton Act complaint, he recused himself, but later denounced Justice Brennan's
opinion for its "superficial understanding of a really impressive record." The record, of
course, had been one he helped to prepare at Root, Clark.
26. Compare Jackson in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
with Jackson in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), or Kunz v. New York, 340
u.s. 290 (1951).
I. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to
Michael Socarras, Ron Wright and Chip Lupu for their helpful comments.
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idea is that, contrary to today's conventional wisdom, the Supreme
Court is not the sole or even final interpreter of the Constitution.
Rather, the power to interpret the Constitution is a shared power of
all three branches of the national government-Congress and the
President, as well as the courts-and that these branches are coequal with one another in the exercise of that power. The power of
the idea lies in its claim that ours is not a system of judicial
supremacy, with the Supreme Court having the final word on all
constitutional issues, but a system of constitutional supremacy accomplished through the structural separation of powers, with each
branch exercising independent, coordinate review over the constitutional judgments of the others.
This idea is not new. Indeed, there is a strong argument that
this was the original vision of the Framers. This theory has repeatedly emerged at important junctures in our constitutional history as
a counterweight to progressively more aggressive assertions of judicial supremacy and power by the federal courts. Historically, the
idea that interpretation is a power shared among independent, coequal branches has been voiced by such prominent figures as
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. This view was featured prominently in a controversial speech by Attorney General Edwin Meese in 1986 that sparked
a new wave of interest in the question of executive branch "nonacquiescence" in Supreme Court precedents, including an issue-length
symposium in the Tulane Law Review.3
The book jacket reviews of The Constitution in Conflict lead the
reader to expect a defense of the "shared power" view from an unlikely source-Yale Law School Professor Robert Burt, a noted academic liberal known chiefly for his work in the areas of family law,
medicine and psychiatry.4 The inside flap advertises the book as
one defending that idea "that the Constitution could be interpreted
by any of the three branches of the government" and rehabilitating
the idea of "equal interpretive power" as a legitimate, indeed preferred, rival to judicial supremacy. Professor Sanford Levison
raves: "The Constitution in Conflict presents a well-thought-out attack on the standard notion of judicial supremacy that views the
Supreme Court as the 'sole' or even 'ultimate' interpreter of the
Constitution."
Such a book might well have been highly interesting. But
3.

61 Tulane L. Rev. 977 (1987).

4. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in DoctorPatient Relations (Free Press, 1979); Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 S.
Ct. Rev. 329 (1979).
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those who come to this book expecting a thorough and systematic
investigation of the idea of coordinate and co-equal interpretive
power will be sorely disappointed. In Professor Burt's hands, the
idea of shared interpretive authority is a throwaway line that has
little to do with Burt's real thesis, which is decidedly less interesting: The Supreme Court, Burt argues, should exercise its authority
in a less authoritarian-and, by implication, less authoritativeway, fashioning compromises and intermediate solutions rather
than hard-and-fast answers. The Court should be careful not to get
too far out in front of public opinion; it must modulate its decisions
to take into account public perceptions and the need for its decisions to gain acceptance. It must also help the parties to appreciate
the other side's position. The effect of its decisions should be "pacification," not "provocation." The Court should decide cases so
that nobody goes away too happy or too unhappy, to the end that
nobody goes away and that the contending factions are forced to
continue in "dialogue" with each other. Neither party should be
able to take a judicial decision and lord it over their litigation opponents, lest the losing party feel too "subjugated" (a too-trendy academic word that Burt hackneys at a rate of once every other page).
A typical Burt passage captures the flavor of the entire book:
"Though it is obviously preferable that all disputants be equally
happy with the outcome and with one another, the equality principle remains viable if everyone is equally unhappy."
This is a tired thesis-warmed over Alexander Bickel but without the grace or sophistication. With Burt, the point is also more
social history than law. He labors to develop his view through a
long and meandering tour through some of the more interesting
events in the Supreme Court's history: Marbury v. Madison and the
Marshall Court's early conflicts with Presidents Jefferson and Jackson; slavery and the Civil War; economic substantive due process in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the New Deal realignment; Brown v. Board of Education, Cooper v. Aaron and the
battle over segregation; and today's raging disputes over capital
punishment, abortion and affirmative action.
Sometimes Burt becomes so interested in what he is saying
about particular cases or epochs in the Court's history that he (and
the reader with him) loses track of the main contour of his argument. These lengthy digressions are almost welcome, though, for
when Burt seeks to squeeze all the lessons of legal history into his
thesis, the book wallows in overwrought sentimentalism:
In all these instances, the Court not only dismissed the possibility
that contending parties on their own might reach a peaceable ac-
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commodation but, more fundamentally, the Court rejected the
goal of accommodation and agreed with those among the antagonists who defined their struggle as necessarily requiring the utter
subjugation of their opponents.

The theme is constantly repeated, with Burt collating previous issue-discussions as he goes along. By the time we make it to abortion, for example, Burt writes as follows:
[F]or abortion restrictions, as for race segregation in Brown, for
economic relations in Lochner, for territorial slavery in Dred
Scott, for federal-state relations in McCulloch-a Court may
properly overturn the coercive imposition because of its inherent
inequality, but only to impose an equal status of stalemate on the
adversaries, not to end the conflict, not to seize victory from one
and award it to the other.
But the most unfortunate aspect of The Constitution in Conflict
is not the staleness of the thesis and its presentation, but the fact
that Burt's approach seems to have no formal role for the legal correctness of one or the other party's claims. To be sure, Burt has
views about who has the politically better position and here he
pretty much follows the traditional liberal line. He is pro-New
Deal, anti-segregation, pro-abortion, anti-capital punishment. But
nowhere does the legal (or moral) correctness of a party's position
play a very important part in Burt's theory of how the Supreme
Court should resolve disputes. There is nothing remotely approaching traditional legal analysis of the issues Burt addresses, and thus
no serious discussion of the possibility that one or the other position
might be right or wrong as a matter of law. Legal disputes are seen
as simple political or social disputes. Everything is an "issue." And
when the Supreme Court decides an issue, its goal should be to create dialogue and accommodation. There are no absolutes. All
claims not to be subjugated are created equal. Anything and everything can be compromised, even the most important principles of
the Constitution.
Thus, Burt treats the right of white Southerners not to be subjugated by the North on a level of moral equivalence, with the right
of blacks not to be subjugated by their Southern white masters in
the institution of slavery. (Seep. 198.) The vice of the Dred Scott
case was not its constitutionalization of a property right in slaves
and dehumanization of blacks but in its failure to strike a satisfactory social compromise that preserved dialogue. (See pp. 186-99.)
The beauty of the desegregation cases was not Brown I 's vindication of the rights of black schoolchildren, but Brown II's moderation of the remedy, so that desegregation created dialogue with,
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rather than subjugation of, the competing claims of white
southerners to maintain Jim Crow. (See pp. 271-85, 293.)
This is ridiculously obtuse. If the point on which the North
seeks to "subjugate" the South is that the South cannot be permitted to insist on slavery for the whole or secession for itself, then we
must choose one "subjugation" over another. If desegregation
"subjugates" white racist notions of how society should be organized, tough luck Bubba. Certain claims have a higher legal and
moral status than others. Some claims and claimants should be unqualifiedly rejected. Burt's vision of justice and the Supreme
Court's role is an intellectually and morally bankrupt one-splitting
the difference between all disputants in the vain hope that they will
then reconcile with each other, irrespective of the legal and moral
merits of the parties' respective claims or the intransigence of their
positions. It is not that Burt is completely agnostic about resultshe thinks the Court should push the parties in certain directionsbut that he is indifferent to legal principles as the means of determining results. He would prefer to have the Court attempt to manage conflict through a two-steps-forward-one-step-back dance that
has more to do with psychology and "dialogue" than with decision
according to legal rules. In short, for Burt, constitutional adjudication is group therapy, not law.
Burt embraces this view for "all disputes which are so polarized that one party regards the other's victory as destructive of
equal status and therefore intolerably oppressive"-that is, in practical terms, all disputes where the parties strongly assert that they
are right and the other side is wrong. Apparently, the best litigation
strategy for a party with an indefensible legal position is to stake out
the most extreme and unreasonable position imaginable. Burt's
Supreme Court will then act as a National Mediation Board that
strives to split the difference between a correct legal position and an
unreasonable one unreasonably maintained.
Can one imagine what would happen if the Court actually were
to behave in such a manner?
II

The April 1992 publication date of The Constitution in Conflict
preceded by just a few weeks the announcement of the most significant Supreme Court decision in decades, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 5 The three Justices filing what has come to be known as the
"joint opinion" in Casey-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou5.

112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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ter---doubtless did not read Professor Burt's book as they worked
on their sixty-page opus on judicial authority and legitimacy. But
their Casey opinion provides an interesting example, and test, of
Burt's basic themes. For the joint opinion is near pure Burt-ism: In
upholding the right to abortion created in Roe v. Wade against state
laws that "unduly burden" that right, there is only the slightest
of nods in the direction of traditional legal analysis. The weight of
the discussion concerns the preservation and enhancement of judicial authority, to the end that wise men and women exercising
"reasoned judgment"6 might impose some sort of Grand Compromise (or pseudo-compromise)7 that does not resolve an issue of constitutional law but instead purports (to borrow Professor Burt's
words) to "promote institutional interactions among the combatants that might lead them toward future 'consultation and
accommodation.' "
The core of the Casey opinion is its reaffirmation of the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade-that women have a constitutional
right to abortion throughout pregnancy that may be made subject
to certain incidental regulations, but that is effectively immune to
actual government restriction.s The majority opinion does not contend that this result is correct as a matter of constitutional first principles, but merely that it should be adhered to as a matter of
precedent, "whether or not mistaken. "9 The ground Casey defends
is not principle, but the Court's own power: by its own admission,
the Court attached unusual importance to the doctrine of stare decisis for the sake of preserving its institutional position as chief expositor of the Constitution, accepted by the people as such.w That
6. Id. at 2806 ("[A]djudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the
Court ... to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts have always exercised:
reasoned judgment.").
7. Professor Burt correctly recognizes what the Court in Casey did not, that its "compromise" over abortion is a lopsided one in favor of the pro-abortion position: "As Roe v.
Wade was actually decided in 1973, however, the Court awarded total victory to one troop
among the combatants." Casey tinkers with, but does not meaningfully alter, the terms of
Roe. See infra n.8.
8. The majority's characterization of its ruling as retaining the essentials of Roe is
undeniably accurate. The aspects of the Pennsylvania statute upheld by the Court do not
actually prevent women from obtaining abortions; they present procedural obstacles only.
The Court made clear that it would strike down procedural obstacles that meaningfully restrict access to abortion. Actual substantive prohibitions on some abortions plainly would be
struck down under the Court's reasoning. In practical operation, there are only slight ditferences between the "strict scrutiny" of abortion regulations in Roe and the "undue burden"
test of Casey. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent is surely mistaken in its assertion that Casey
retains but "the outer shell" of Roe but "beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that
case." 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Casey maintains the substance and
makes slight alterations in the outer shell.
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
10. Id. at 2814 ("Our analysis would not be complete, however, without explaining why
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acceptance, the Court said, would be threatened were it to overrule
Roe v. Wade, because of the acceptance Roe has obtained (at least in
some quarters) and because of the possibility that the Court would
be perceived as succumbing to political pressure -"overrul[ing]
under fire" 11-were it to do so.
One may rightly question (as did Justice Scalia's dissent), the
accuracy of the majority's realpolitik assessment, 12 and may also
question (as did Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent), whether the
Court might not as easily be perceived as succumbing to political
pressure in reaffirming Roe rather than overruling it.1J But the
truly extraordinary aspect of the majority's discussion is the suggestion that politics or perceptions should play any role at all in the
Court's decisional calculus, with respect to the doctrine of stare decisis or any other matter. The Court's "legitimacy", the majority
wrote, is "a product of substance and perception."14 The success of
the Court in maintaining real or perceived legitimacy is determined
by the "people's acceptance" of the Court's decisions.ls Accordingly, the Court "must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them .... "16 Those claims should, of course, be "principled," or at
least "grounded truly in principle."17 Thus, the majority concludes,
overruling Roe's central holding ... would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise
the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of
law. To understand why this would be so, it is necessary to understand the source of this
Court's authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the
country's understanding of itself .... "); see also id. at 2816 ("If the Court's legitimacy should
be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its
constitutional ideals.").
II. ld. at 2815.
12. Id. at 2883 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Opinion polls consistently show that a majority
of the public favors significant restrictions on abortion, the size of the majority depending on
the nature of the restriction and, often, the way the question is framed. See, e.g., Abortion
and Moral Beliefs (Am. Political Network, Mar. I, 1991). (Gallup Poll commissioned by
Americans United for Life but conducted independently shows that substantial majorities of
Americans disapprove of abortion in most circumstances under which it is currently per·
formed); Boston Globe, Mar. 31, 1989 at I, col. I (national polls shows large majority (78%)
of population opposes abortion in most circumstances, amounting to all but a tiny fraction of
reasons cited by women having abortions, but 53% would allow abortions in those exceptional circumstances); The New York Times, Dec. I, 1987 (New York Times/CBS News poll
showing similar results); USA Today, Jan. 2, 1990 at I, col. 6 (only 37% believe abortions
should be left to a woman and her doctor, large majority favoring various degree of
restrictions).
13. 112 S. Ct. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
14. ld. at 2814 (emphasis added).
15. ld.
16. Id.
17. Id. The majority's understanding of what constitutes a principled justification for a
holding, however, is quite ecumenical: "apposite legal principle" in constitutional cases con·
sists of "the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws."
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"the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation."Is
The Court's discussion is dotted with euphonious references to
"the rule of law" and "constitutional principle," but the boldness of
its claim nonetheless comes through plainly: While social and political pressures do not "as such" dictate how the Court decides cases,
they nonetheless bear on how the decisions of the Court will be perceived, and the Court must take those perceptions into account in
order to maintain its legitimacy. If the Court's decisions should
maintain a principled appearance (under broadly defined criteria),
they need not-and cannot-rest on pure principle, especially if
that principle suggests a politically controversial outcome. Rather,
the outcome must be one that readily can be "accepted by the Nation"; its legal justification need only be "sufficiently plausible to be
[so] accepted." For the Casey majority, the Court's legitimacy depends not on the legal correctness of its decisions, but on some combination of legal plausibility and political acceptability.
Casey continues: The Court "would almost certainly fail to receive the benefit of the doubt"I9 when overruling cases in two circumstances. The first is where the Court overrules too frequently:
"There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior courts."2o This proposition is doubtful as an empirical matter; a great deal of error plausibly may be ascribed to earlier
decisions. If (as the Court recognizes) courts must be permitted to
correct some errors on the theory that "two wrongs do not make a
right," how is it that there can be, in principle, too much error correction-on the theory that "too many rights make a wrong"?
What the majority probably means is that there is an increasing cost
to overruling in terms of the Court's prestige-the currency with
which the majority is chiefly concerned. So stated, the point seems
sound as a logical matter, but it does not reflect well on the Court.
This argument is probably posted as a defensive rear guard against
criticism of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter as being inconsistent
for having voted to overrule numerous other cases.
The second situation in which the majority feared losing the
benefit of the public's doubt was the overruling of a highly controversial, deeply divisive "watershed" case in which the Court had
Id. The latter part of this formulation is, of course, circular. Apposite legal principle consists
of those sources on which the Court chooses to draw (aside from the Constitution).
18. ld. at 2814.
19. Id. at 2815.
20. ld.
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earlier "staked its authority"z':
Where ... the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve
the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and in
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that
the resolution ofthe normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution.22

In other words, it is precisely because of the controversial,
deeply disputed nature of the Roe decision and the rare importance
it has assumed in contemporary debate over the legitimacy of the
Court that the majority felt it could not now back down, "whether
or not mistaken" in the first instance.23 (This aspect of the majority
opinion earned Justice Scalia's particular ire as "czarist arrogance."24) The Casey opinion treats the abortion issue as one on
which "[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree"zs but
on which these good people should obligingly put their differences
aside once the Court has spoken, and accept the Court's decree.
The Court's "promise of constancy" must be kept for the sake of
keeping faith with those who have been "tested by following" a controversial decision.26 The people must accept the will of the Justices
because "the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law" is inseparable from their acceptance of
the decisions of "the Court invested with the authority to ... speak
before all others for their constitutional ideals. "27
Putting aside the Court's pretentious rhetoric, there are at least
three fundamental problems with the vision of judicial-political legitimacy reflected in these passages-criticisms equally applicable
to Burt's thesis.
First, it is wrong in principle. The legitimacy of the Supreme
Court in our constitutional system rests not on its ability to fashion
social and political compromises but on its ability to render deci21. Id. at 2815.
22. Id. at 2815.
23. Id. at 2810. See also id. at 2816 ("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was
based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.") (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2883: "I cannot agree with,
indeed I am appalled by, the Court's suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an
erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced--against overruling, no lessby the substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated."
25. 112 S. Ct. at 2806. See also id. at 2807 ("As with abortion, reasonable people will
have differences of opinion about [contraception].").
26. Id. at 2815.
27. Id. at 2816.
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sions that the public readily can recognize as straightforward interpretations of a constitutional or statutory text. The Court's
legitimacy rests on its ability to render non-politicallegal judgment
in accordance with principles of interpretation that stand outside
the judges' personal sense of what is expedient, practical or desirable as a policy matter. That is why Roe (and now Casey) strikes so
deeply at the heart of the Court's legitimacy: it is perceived, rightly,
as pure judicial fiat having no basis in constitutional text or
history.2s
True, political opposition to Roe flows primarily from its policy result. But unlike other socially explosive decisions (like Brown
v. Board of Education), opposition to the abortion decisions cannot
be met with the rejoinder that the words of the Constitution require
such a result, for they plainly do not. (Defenders of Brown could
properly point straight to the words "equal protection of the laws.")
In this respect, Casey's legitimacy (or lack thereof) is completely
dependent on Roe's. Adherence to precedent may provide the formal trapping of legitimacy, but not its substance. If the precedent
decision is fundamentally illegitimate, no amount of discussion of
stare decisis can supply the defect; the doctrine of stare decisis becomes an excuse for repeating error. And where stare decisis is defended solely in terms of the need to preserve the perception of
legitimacy so that the Court may maintain its institutional power,
one may fairly wonder whether the doctrine is empty and circular.
Casey reveals just how far the Court has strayed from the grounds
on which its legitimacy depends.
Casey's second fundamental problem is the notion that the
Court can successfully defuse controversy in general and the abortion controversy in particular by fashioning astute and expedient
"compromises" (all the while denying doing so). This is embarrassingly naive. Historically, as Burt notes, the Court has been more of
a provocateur than peacemaker, its supposed "compromises" frequently exacerbating social strife-Dred Scott, Lochner and Plessy
leap to mind, along with Roe. The problem is not that the Court
has done a poor job of peacemaking but that it invariably will perform poorly a task that is not its job and for which it is not particularly well suited. The attempted practice of judicial statesmanship
collapses into judicial authoritarianism, as the Court seeks to enforce as law the terms of the "compromise" it has imposed, in the
28. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 Yale L.J. 920, 935-37 (1973). I have developed this point at length elsewhere. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Roben M
Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J. Law & Religion 33, 68-72 (1989).
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face of resistance by one or both of the parties. Politically sensitive
judging does not avoid the need to hand down an Order of the
Court; it merely relocates the decree to a position the Justices perceive (often incorrectly) to be more politically acceptable.
Such a relocation is always away from principle-away from
what an unvarnished legal analysis would produce. The idea that
the Court will gain more popular respect by searching for the "sufficiently plausible to be accepted," half-principled-half-political solution than by being principled is highly dubious. Even where the
result is politically popular, the very act of judicial compromise
compromises the judiciary's authority and legitimacy by rendering
its decisions that of a transparently political body. The parties and
the public are not fooled, and the Court's decisions become less authoritative in the eyes of the People, not more so. One consequence
of Casey is likely to be-and should be-the de-legitimation of the
present Supreme Court.
The third problem has to do with the nature of Roe as being a
"watershed" decision. The idea that the more extraordinary the
precedent-the more remote its connection to constitutional text,
the more severe its departure from tradition and the more wrenching its social and moral consequences-the less it should be subject
to reconsideration, is strange indeed. It is the Big Lie theory applied to judicial decisionmaking: the bigger and more outrageous
the lie, the more likely it is to be believed. If the Court is going to
depart from text, history and precedent, it should make a really colossal departure and proclaim it with gusto. (That's what makes it a
"watershed," after all.) Future Courts will then feel obliged to "remain steadfast"29 to the watershed for the sake of preserving the
appearance that the judiciary is governed by the rule of law. The
logic of the "watershed" argument would suggest that economic
substantive due process and the lawfulness of segregation-the
Lochner and Plessy watersheds-should have been preserved.
One would think that the Court's legitimacy might have been
enhanced by overruling Roe, as it was by overruling Plessy. Indeed,
before Casey was handed down, it might have been guessed that
there could be as many as seven votes to overrule Roe-O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter joining the four dissenters. An opinion written
by O'Connor, the first woman Justice and one who had publicly
anguished over Roe, for a solid majority of seven, and adopting the
same high-church tone as Casey, might well have been "perceived"
as more legitimate than the deeply and bitterly divided Casey decision. Moreover, if the result proved contrary to public opinion, that
29.

112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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outcome would be susceptible to popular revision, since overruling
Roe would merely have returned the issue to the democratic process. The Supreme Court would not have been the focus of continued controversy.
Why did not O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter choose this
course, which would seem equally as politically astute? There are
three possible explanations, none of which is very flattering to those
three Justices. The first possibility is that these three now support a
broad right to abortion as a matter of substantive constitutional
law-a switch of positions by Kennedy and O'Connor-and that
their rhetoric about the Court's legitimacy merely provides political
and intellectual cover for their present positions. The second possible explanation is more disturbing-that these Justices genuinely
view the craft of judging as one of divining that which will prove a
balance "accepted by the Nation" and then seeking a "sufficiently
plausible" legal justification for that outcome. Professor Burt could
not have said it half as well.Jo If this is the explanation, Casey is a
jurisprudential watershed in its own right, proclaiming an era of
Burt-like social-psychological-political constitutional judging.
The third possible explanation is perhaps the most disturbing
of all, and probably the most likely. O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were concerned first and foremost not to be seen as paying off
the pro-life political movement for their nominations as Justices,
even if they were persuaded that Roe was bad law and otherwise
would be inclined to overrule it. In an atmosphere poisoned by bitter confirmation disputes centering on the issue of abortion, by
30. Professor Burt's own position on abortion is incoherent: He believes the Court was
wrong to impose an answer to the abortion controversy in Roe, but only because such intervention was not necessary to insure that the issue would remain "avidly controverted."
Nonetheless, the "subjugative impositions" of the abortion controversy (Burt means state
regulation of women's rights to abort their unborn children; he does not appear to consider
the possible "subjugative imposition" on the child) mean that some sort of substantial abortion right must be protected. The right he would create is plenary but patchwork: states
would be free to regulate and prohibit abortions, but only if enough states adopt "free-choice
statutes" and women residing in the other states live within reasonable travel distance of
those states. Residency restrictions would be unconstitutional and states would be required
(apparently as a matter of constitutional law) to provide financial assistance to overcome the
financial burdens on women travelling from other states to obtain abortions. (It is not at all
clear that Burt's "compromise" is any less abortion-on-demand than Roe or Casey. It certainly has no firmer basis in the Constitution.)
On the issue of stare decisis, however, Burt comes down remarkably close to Casey:
Even if the Court was wrong in the first instance, it "would [not] be justified in simply overruling Roe" twenty years later. "The Court drew the lines of polarized confrontation and
cannot now walk away from this subjugative conflict that it, more than any other institution,
was instrumental in defining as such." However, Burt held little hope that the Court "might
work to redefine the abortion controversy away from this subjugative ethos and toward the
equality ideal," predicting instead that Roe would soon be reversed "and in its place, so far as
this Court is concerned, force will rule."
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protestors on both sides besieging the Court's grounds and by hysterical media attention, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were concerned that no one have the impression that they had been
"bought"-that they had given secret commitments on abortion as
the price for a seat on the Supreme Court. They were not so much
concerned with the Court's legitimacy but with perceptions of their
own individual legitimacy. Whatever views they might have had on
abortion and Roe were subordinated to this primary, personal concern. There is evidence for this explanation in the opinion itself:
the first paragraph's reference to the executive branch's repeated
requests over the past decade that the Court reconsider Roe;Jt the
exalted tone; the extended discussion of stare decisis and the Court's
legitimacy; yet the unwillingness to embrace Roe as correct in principle (and occasional hints that at least some thought it wrong in
principle).32
The third explanation combines the worst aspects of the other
two. Not only is the Casey rhetoric a cover for a switch in positions, it is a cover for a switch the Justices do not even believe in
themselves. And even if Casey was a case-specific personal declaration of independence, the Justices making it will feel the need to
adhere to the Burt-like jurisprudential principles stated there. It
would be sadly ironic if what Professor Burt has urged out of a
naive and misguided sense of judicial statesmanship has become law
out of the basest and most personal of motives-the concern of individual Justices for their own prestige, power and public image.
It is doubtful that even those who are cheered by the result in
Casey respect the Court's reasoning. The concern for image and for
the politically expedient, and the lack of concern for principled legal
analysis, should be deeply troubling to everyone, regardless of their
political views on abortion. The same is true of Burt's thesis. In its
acutely self-conscious (and self-important) conception of the judicial role, in its arrogance about its own wisdom and in its naivete
and presumptuousness in purporting permanently to "settle" a divisive political and moral issue by constituting itself as a national
abortion-law mediation panel, the Court's Casey decision illustrates
(far better than Burt's book) the hazards of Professor Burt's method
in practical operation. Casey shows that the Justices will tend to
use that method to fashion Grand Compromises not for lofty purposes of public peace, but for baser motives of seeking to preserve
positive public perceptions of the Justices themselves.
31.
32.

112 S. Ct. at 2803.
ld. at 2810, 2816.
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III
There is no necessary connection between Burt's actual theme
of judicial mediation and the book's advertised theme of a challenge
to the idea of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
One might favor a mediator's role as the appropriate manner in
which "supreme" interpretive power should be exercised. But one
might also favor such a role out of the perceived need to accommodate other branches that share interpretive power on an equal basis.
Burt seems to shade toward the latter view, but his discussion waffles foggily between the two, never clearly coming to rest on either
of them.
One wonders what would have been the result had the book
seriously and systematically explored the thesis that the Supreme
Court is not the supreme, or even final, interpreter of the Constitution, but must share that power with other actors in our constitutional system-the President, the Congress, the states. How might
such a reading affect our understanding of the Supreme Court's role
in our constitutional system? How might it affect our understanding of the power of the Court to "say what the law is" in relation to
the other branches? In short, one wonders what might have been
the result had Burt written the book advertised by the dust cover.
The raw materials for such a study are present in the same
legal history that makes up Burt's discussion in The Constitution in
Conflict: John Marshall's argument for judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison; Andrew Jackson's presidential dissent to the Marshall
Court's holding in the Bank controversy; Abraham Lincoln's resistance to the Taney Court's ruling in Dred Scott; the Court's
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education and state government resistance to the post-Brown desegregation decrees, exemplified in the Little Rock situation and culminating in Cooper v. Aaron;
the Nixon Tapes case; the ongoing dispute over abortion.
Burt begins by noting, accurately, that John Marshall's justification for judicial review in Marbury "carefully avoided any claim
for judicial supremacy." But the discussion quickly degenerates
into the sentimental and speculative as Burt makes the historically
unsupportable claim that Marshall was simply trying to engage Jefferson in a constructive dialogue.33 He never returns to any system33. According to Burt, John Marshall was claiming that judges "were an appropriate
instrumentality for this protective, conflict-transcending, and therefore unifying purpose for
the law" and was "in effect asking Jefferson to transcend the divisive politics of 'the contest of
opinion through which we have passed' and to give content to the unifying terms of his
inaugural address, that the defeated 'minority possess their equal rights, which equal law
must protect.' " It is hard to imagine that anyone familiar with the historical circums~ces
of the Marbury case and the Republican-Federalist acrimony of the era could take senously
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atic discussion of the supremacy versus coordinacy issue.
Suppose, however, that Marbury is read-as it fairly can be
read-as embracing only a co-equal, coordinate power of judicial
interpretation, founded on the ideas of separation-of-powers and the
independence of the judge's oath, and not as proclaiming judicial
preeminence in legal interpretation. Marbury's separation-of-powers argument is, in a nutshell, that the structure of the Constitution,
and the political theory of written constitutions generally, requires
that the judges be free to interpret the law independently of the
views of Congress. To hold that one branch's (the court's) interpretation is controlled by another's (Congress's) is to bestow a "practical and real omnipotence" on the controlling branch.34 But this
argument suggests not that the judicial branch is the supreme interpreter, but that each branch has a power of legal review over the
determinations of the others.Js Similarly, Marbury's argument
from the oath requirement of Article VI-that judges would violate
their oaths if they were forced to acquiesce in a violation of the
Constitution by deferring to the views of another branchJ6,_with
equal ease can be turned into an argument against judicial
supremacy. The President, members of Congress and even the executive, legislative and judicial officers of the states, swear an oath
to uphold the Constitution.
Taken seriously, this reading of Marbury has rather sweeping
and startling implications. Do Congress and the President therefore
have the prerogative to disregard (to "overrule"?) Supreme Court
decisions with which they disagree when considering legislation?
Does the President have the power to refuse to enforce Supreme
Court judgments that he believes are legally improper? Is a state
governor bound by his oath to resist by every means possible judicial decrees that he conscientiously believes are based on unfaithful
interpretations of the Constitution?
Each of these questions corresponds to an actual historical
event. Jackson's veto of the Bank bill was premised on the idea that
"[e]ach public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
the suggestion that Marshall's Marbury opinion was the act of a Great Conciliator intent on
engaging Jefferson in dialogue and constructive criticism. See generally James M. O'Fallon,
''Marbury", 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219 (1992); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. I (1969).
34. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
35. See Alexander Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 3-4 (2d ed. 1986); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 905, 919-22 (1990).
36. The Court characterizes such a requirement of deference, against one's own conscientious judgment as to what the Constitution requires, as "immoral," "worse than solemn
mockery" and even "a crime." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 180.
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swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others." Thus, the "opinion of the judges has no
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of
both."37 As a Senate candidate in 1858, Lincoln declared his opposition to Dred Scott and his refusal to be bound by it as a legislator;
the decision was not binding "as a political rule" preventing Congress or the President from "resisting it" by passing legislation inconsistent with it. As President, Lincoln defied Chief Justice
Taney's order declaring unconstitutional Lincoln's suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of civil insurrection in
Baltimore in April 1861. Lincoln directed subordinate executive officers to ignore Taney's order in Ex Parte Merryman, either because
Lincoln believed that Taney was wrong on the merits of the precise
constitutional issue presented or because Lincoln interpreted the
Constitution to justify otherwise unconstitutional actions when necessary to suppress insurrection threatening the maintenance of the
constitutional union.3s
Modern constitutional conflicts raise many of the same issues.
Richard Nixon complied with the Court's decision in United States
v. Nixon, but he had made noises about refusing to do so. Had he
been convinced of the legal correctness of his claim of executive
privilege, should he not have refused to produce the tapes? Would
Arkansas Governor Faubus have been within his constitutional prerogative (if still morally and legally wrong) in resisting desegregation in Little Rock if he conscientiously believed that the Brown
decision was unlawful? Could an anti-abortion President legitimately announce that Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey were wrongly decided, and that the executive branch would
take no action to enforce any injunction issued by a federal court
against state abortion legislation?
Are there principled distinctions among these various situations, or must we choose between judicial supremacy and radical
decentralization? If so, is it so clear which alternative is to be preferred? Which one is more consistent with the original understanding and design of the Constitution? Burt asks none of these
37. Veto Message, July 10, 1832 3 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1139, 1145
(Bureau of Nat'l Literature, 1897).
38. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J., Circuit Justice).
See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 261-62, 286-87 (Oxford U. Press, 1988).
Curiously, Burt says nothing about this singular and jurisprudentially very important incident of a President's refusal to honor a judicial decree directed against him personally. For a
discussion of Merryman and its implications, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,- Cardozo L. Rev.
- (1993) (symposium issue) (forthcoming).
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questions, the discussion of which would have made a far more interesting book-and one better suited to its title-than The Constitution in Conflict turned out to be. Asking these questions might
also have shed light on the question with which Burt is most concerned: how is the judiciary's interpretive power to be exercised?
The shared power view offers at least two limited insights on this
question.
First, if the power of constitutional interpretation is viewed as
shared, rather than the Court's exclusive prerogative, there would
seem less warrant for the Court taking itself and perceptions of its
institutional integrity quite so seriously, (as it did in Casey, for example). If those in other branches are not, in fact, required to acquiesce in the Court's constitutional judgments, then there is no
need to adhere to precedents out of an overwrought sense of obligation-a "promise of constancy,"39 a commitment "to remain
steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for nothing"40-to those in
other branches who will be "tested by following" the Court.41 Nor
must precedents be followed on the ground that the Nation's "very
ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals" is bound up in
devotion to a Court "invested with the authority to ... speak before
all others for their constitutional ideals. "42 Perhaps the legitimacy
of the Court depends on a fairly high doctrine of judicial inerrancy
if the underlying premise is one of judicial supremacy. But if the
premise is one of co-equal authority and interpretive tension among
the branches with the political branches regarded as playing an
equal role, the legitimacy of the system is not dependent on whether
the Nation accepts as indisputably correct the views of any one institution within that system.43
Second, at the same time that a shared power model might suggest that the Court take itselfless seriously, it might suggest that the
Court not act so politically. That role-the tempering of principle
with pragmatism-can be expected to be performed all too aggressively by the political branches. It does not follow from the premise
of shared power that the Court should modulate its decisions to
take into account political realities, either to effect compromise or
39.

112 S. Ct. at 2815.
ld.
ld.
42. ld. at 2816. See also id. at 2814 ("The root of American governmental power is
revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the
Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court.").
43. Again, contrast the (inconsistent) words of Casey: "[T]he justification claimed
must be beyond dispute . ... [T]he Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled
decisions ... sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (emphasis added).
40.
41.
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to avoid rendering decisions that will likely bring the Court into
conflict with the President, the Congress, the states or the people.
On the contrary, to do so would be to compromise away in advance
the one contribution it can best make to government: the integrity
of its judgments. The actual "final" constitutional resolution of an
issue will be determined by the extent to which the executive, the
Congress, the states and the people agree or disagree with the
Court's interpretation and translate that constitutional judgment
into limitations on or refinements of the Court's ruling. But that
resolution is a matter properly out of the Court's control and,
strictly speaking, should be none of its concern. The Justices
should-indeed, because of their oaths, must-state what they believe is a proper interpretation of the law, irrespective of political
consequences, public perceptions or concern for their own power.
The Constitution in Conflict implicitly rejects such a view of the
Court's role in favor of a more self-consciously political role. That
Professor Burt has taken this position is not of enormous moment.
That the Supreme Court has made considerations of power and
politics the centerpiece of its new jurisprudence of "reasoned judgment" is of far greater cause for concern.
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In this small volume James Ely puts forth a careful, wide-ranging and blessedly terse survey of the constitutional treatment of
property rights over the course of American history. This is not a
book of constitutional theory, nor is it a book on the theory of property rights; and although the author makes a number of interesting
and informed judgments about the legal events he describes, he does
not give the reader many explicit clues about the theoretical stance
from which these comments emerge. Extrapolating from the text
itself, Ely seems to be working from the perspective of ordinary language or ordinary understanding. That is, he appears to be asking
what most people mean by "property," and then describing the
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